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INTRODUCTION
The concept of economic interest is a very complex and
crucial issue, the understanding of which is a prerequisite for
proper planning in natural resource taxation.' The concept
controls the allowance of the depletion deduction 2 and, in
I See Sneed, The Economic Interest - An Expanding Concept, 35 TEX. L. REV.
309 (1957). The author states in pertinent part:
[T]hese are weary thoughts of one who has, with no little grimness, just
completed the examination of many judicial and administrative pronounce-
ments concerning the nature of the most ubiquitous concept in the income
tax law of mineral interests - the economic interest. Their jaded tone should
not mislead the reader. An understanding of this concept is the bedrock
upon which any reasonably thorough appreciation of mineral tax law must
be built. Grasp the economic-interest notion and many arcane aspects of
this highly glamorous field will stand revealed.
Id. at 309.
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(l) (as amended in 1973) states: "Annual depletion
deductions are allowed only to the owner of an economic interest in mineral deposits or
standing timber." This regulation relates to both cost depletion and percentage depletion.
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certain mineral transactions, determines whether a sale or a
lease has occurred.3 Additionally, for windfall profit tax pur-
poses, any liability rests with the producer as a result of
possessing an economic interest in the oil in place.
4
While economic interest relates to several different areas
of mineral tax law, its initial development began with the
depletion allowance for oil and gas as introduced by the Su-
preme Court in the landmark decision of Palmer v. Bender.
5
Although Palmer is the foundation for any analysis of eco-
nomic interest, the concept has undergone a continuing evo-
lutionary process. Since the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and
the related Treasury regulations encompassing this issue have
provided very little guidance, developments have generally re-
sulted from judicial decisions.6 A review of the judicial devel-
opment of economic interest is essential to its understanding
and applicability to the multifarious transactions occurring in
the mineral area.
This Article will examine the historical aspect of the eco-
nomic interest concept beginning with the early statutory
framework of the depletion allowance. Next, several significant
Supreme Court cases will be discussed to illustrate both the
evolution of the concept in tax law, and its illusory nature for
which it is known. 7 The policy considerations relating to de-
pletion and economic interest will be examined along with an
analysis of the application of the policy by the Tax Court.
Before the historical and policy considerations are presented,
See Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(a) (as amended in 1980).
I.R.C. § 4996(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 51.4996-1(b)(1) (as
amended in 1986). To determine if a production payment qualifies as an economic
interest, see I.R.C. § 636 (West Supp. 1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1 (1973); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.636-2 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3 (1973). Section 636 states that generally a retained
production payment is not considered an economic interest unless: (1) the proceeds are
pledged for the exploration or development of the mineral, or (2) the production payment
was retained by the lessor in a leasing arrangement. I.R.C. § 636 (West Supp. 1987).
287 U.S. 551 (1933).
6 See generally I.R.C. § 611(a) (West 1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-0 (1968); Treas.
Reg. § 1.611-1 (as amended in 1973). Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(l) provides a general
definition of economic interest that is difficult to apply to many natural resource
transactions.
' See C. RUSSELL & R. Bow-HAY, INcOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
2.09 (1987) (describing the economic interest concept as illusory).
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the Article will present a detailed analysis of the treatment of
the economic interest concept in the current Code 8 and Reg-
ulations .9
I. ECONOMIC INTEREST IN CURRENT TAX LAW
Economic interest is a broad concept encompassing a va-
riety of property interests.' 0 The specific type of property
interest present in a transaction depends on the division of the
mineral rights for a particular tract of land containing the oil,
gas, or solid minerals in place." These different property in-
terests make possible the various arrangements encountered in
the natural resource area, the tax consequences of which are
governed by the presence or absence of economic interest.
A. Definition
The general definition of an economic interest is provided
in the Treasury regulations:
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral
in place or standing timber and secures, by any form of legal
relationship, income derived from the extraction of the min-
eral or severance of the timber, to which he must look for
a return of his capital.
12
This definition contains two important factors: 1) investment
and 2) income, both of which are necessary for establishing
an economic interest.
To satisfy the first factor of the definition, the investment
must be in the mineral before its removal. Investment merely
I.R.C. § 631(b) & (c) (West Supp. 1987).
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 (as amended in 1973).
10 See Russell & R. Bowhay, supra note 7.
See id. at 11 2.02-2.08 (stating that the types of interests are: (1) mineral interest,
(2) royalty interest, (3) working or operating interest, (4) overriding royalty, (5) net
profits interest, (6) production payment, and (7) carried interest). For an excellent
discussion of the operating interest, see Rigsby, The Operating Interest: An Essential
Element In Deducting Mining Exploration and Development Costs?, I J. MIN. L. &
PoL'y 21 (1985).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973).
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in producing equipment or immovable assets will not suffice.13
However, whether an investment exists can sometimes be dif-
ficult to discern since the investment in the mineral does not
have to be a monetary one,' 4 but it must at least be a legal
investment. 5 The main criterion for an appropriate investment
apparently pertains to possessing a "value" which will decrease
upon the extraction and sale of the mineral deposit.
6
The income factor of the definition of economic interest
focuses on how the proceeds are actually derived from the
mineral sale. Generally, for economic interest to be present,
the amounts to be realized must be contingent rather than
involve a guaranteed lump sum paid without regard to the
quantity of the mineral extracted. 7 For a taxpayer already
owning an economic interest (e.g., owner of a mineral deposit),
the proceeds may consist of a fixed amount per unit as long
as it is tied to production quantity, 8 or it may be an amount
connected to a share of the proceeds from production and
mineral sale.' 9 In both situations the total dollar amount of
the proceeds is not guaranteed; thus, a contingency is present.
For a taxpayer attempting to acquire an economic interest not
already possessed (e.g., a contract miner), the proceeds should
be tied to the market price, thereby establishing the contin-
gency. 20 Therefore, having the correct type of income source,
in addition to an appropriate investment, is necessary to dis-
tinguish a true economic interest from similar arrangements.
2'
, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 368 (1938).
' See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 316 (1956); see
infra note 148 and accompanying text.
1 See Harrington, Jr. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 1968).
16 See G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 215-16.
11 For cases involving lump sum payments, see, e.g., Day v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 1417 (1970); Rhodes v. United States, 464 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1972).
" This type of arrangement is a basic royalty interest.
See Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 604 (1946); Burton-
Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946). But cf. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land
Dev. Co., 303 U.S. 372 (1938). Examples of these types of arrangements are net profits
interests and production payments.
o United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 583 (1981).
2, Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973) (A "person who has no capital
investment in the mineral deposit ... does not possess an economic interest merely
because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary
advantage derived from production.").
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B. Depletion
For depletion purposes, the Code allows a deduction based
on a reasonable amount of the mineral's cost computed by
taking into consideration the peculiar conditions in each case.
22
This deduction, however, can only be claimed by taxpayers
owning an economic interest in the natural resource deposit.
23
The depletion deduction amount is computed under two alter-
native methods: cost depletion and percentage depletion. Cost
depletion is based on the cost of acquiring the natural resource
itself, or the cost of acquiring the rights to extract the re-
source.2 4 Percentage depletion, with certain limitations, is gen-
erally computed by means of applying a specific percentage to
the income derived from the resource. 2 The larger of the two
amounts determined under the above alternatives is required
to be used as the depletion deduction actually taken. 26 The
possession of an economic interest is the key to securing an
important tax deduction, made even more valuable when per-
centage depletion is in excess of cost depletion.
27
C. Capital Gains
In addition to controlling the depletion deduction, eco-
nomic interest has been important in characterizing the nature
of a transaction as a sale or a lease when disposing of natural
I.R.C. § 611(a) (West 1967).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973).
See I.R.C. § 612 (West 1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-
2 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (as amended in 1977); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965);
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-5 (1982).
21 See I.R.C. § 613 (West Supp. 1987); I.R.C. § 613A (West Supp. 1987); Treas.
Reg. § 1.613-1 (as amended in 1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2 (as amended in 1977); Treas.
Reg. § 1.613-3 (as amended in 1968); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4 (1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-
5 (as amended in 1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.613A-1 (1977).
26 I.R.C. § 613(a) (West Supp. 1987).
11 The Tax Reform Act of 1975 repealed the percentage depletion provisions for
domestic and foreign oil and gas production with several exceptions. I.R.C. § 613A
(West Supp. 1987) provides for a current 15% rate for regulated natural gas sold under
a fixed contract, natural gas from geopressured brine, and independent producers and
royalty owners up to 1,000 barrels of oil per day, or up to 6,000 cubic feet of natural
gas per day.
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resource property. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,28
some taxpayers desired to have a transaction classified as an
exchange of a capital asset due to the very preferential treat-
ment afforded long-term capital gains. 29 To accomplish this
result with transfers of most mineral properties, the economic
interest could not be retained since to do so would cause the
transaction to be characterized as a lease rather than a sale.30
Transactions involving coal or domestic iron ore, however, are
treated differently. If the economic interest is retained upon
the transfer of those mineral properties, the property is cate-
gorized as a section 1231 asset resulting in capital gain poten-
tial.3 Thus, identifying either the transfer or retention of
economic interest is essential for proper structuring of the
natural resource arrangements.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
The economic interest concept was introduced by the Su-
preme Court in 1933 in Palmer v. Bender 32 while attempting
to explain which taxpayers were allowed a depletion deduction
in certain complex mineral transactions.33 Since the deduction
was not limited to the cost of the property interests, the de-
pletion allowance had become quite attractive.3 4 In the early
revenue acts, however, the depletion allowance was not as
generous."
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
9 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the sixty percent deduction available for
long-term capital gains, which was previously granted by I.R.C. § 1202(a) (West 1967).
Even after this change, taxpayers will still have an incentive to classify a gain as a long-
term capital gain if large capital losses are present. I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) (West Supp.
1987) has retained the $3,000 per year net capital loss deduction limitation for individuals.
'o See generally United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'g 254
F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1966); Rev. Rul. 69-466, 1969-2 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 82-221,
1982-2 C.B. 113. For most types of minerals, if an economic interest is retained upon
transfer of the mineral rights, the resulting income is royalty income. Conversely, if the
economic interest is transferred along with the mineral rights transfer, a capital asset
sale occurs if the property was a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.
11 See I.R.C. § 631(c) (West Supp. 1987); I.R.C. § 1231(b)(2) (West 1967); Treas.
Reg. § 1.631-3 (as amended in 1980).
32 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
Id. at 558.
'" See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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A. Early Revenue Acts
In drafting the Tariff Act of 1909,36 which contained the
taxing of corporate income,3 7 Congress did not include a pro-
vision for allowing a deduction based on the depletion of
natural resources. A depreciation deduction for other assets
was allowed,38 however, and while it is not known whether
Congress intentionally left out a depletion allowance, the Su-
preme Court applied the statutes literally and denied depletion
in two tax cases arising under the Act.39
With the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, 40 the
Tariff Act of 191341 introduced the initial depletion deduc-
tion.42 From that point the allowance was regarded as a matter
of legislative grace. 43 The deduction under this Act was to be
a "reasonable allowance" for the exhaustion and wear and
tear of the property, but the amount was limited to only five
percent of the gross value of production." Congress had rec-
ognized the special circumstances of the mining industry; the
value of an investment in natural resource property declines
as the mineral is removed, thus, an allowance for that decline
is justified since taxable income would be recognized from the
property. Notwithstanding the fact that depletion was allowed,
it might have been added to the Act as an afterthought, 45 and
it was possible that the modest limitation of five percent of
6 Tariff Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, 36 Stat. 11.
37 Id. § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
11 Id. § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
19 Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Von Baumbach v.
Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S. 503 (1917).
' U.S. CONST. Amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment provides that "[tihe
Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." Id.
4 Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 166.
41 Several prior authors have indicated that the term "depletion" did not appear
in the statutes until the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756. See Baker, The Nature of
Depletable Income, 7 TAx L. REv. 267, 269 (1952); Disney, The Depletion Allowance,
16 TAx MAG. 262, 264 (1938). Actually, however, the term did appear in the Tariff Act of 1913.
See Baker, supra note 42, at 269.
Tariff Act of 1913, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (applicable to individuals); Id. §
II(G)(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172-73 (applicable to corporations).
• Baker, supra note 42, at 269 (referencing H.R. REP. No. 86, 63d Cong. 1st
Sess. 25 (1913)).
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the value mined could have resulted in a total deduction of an
amount less than the actual cost of the property in some
circumstances .46
In considering the Revenue Act of 1916, 47 two observations
about Congress are worthy of discussion. First, congressional
understanding of the depletion allowance became more sophis-
ticated and detailed as reflected within the wording of tax law.
The statutes included references indicating which method pro-
ducers should use in determining the depletion deduction.
48
Secondly, by specifically mentioning oil and gas, Congress was
for the first time recognizing the emerging importance of those
resources. The 1916 Act was also more generous in regard to
the total depletion allowed for a particular mineral deposit.
For property acquired after March 1, 1913, the total accumu-
lated amount of the deduction could be the property's original
cost. For property acquired before that date, the total amount
allowed was the fair value on March 1, 1913.
49
B. Discovery Depletion
The Revenue Act of 191850 led to the discovery and devel-
opment of essential natural resources; this became known as
"discovery depletion." World War I had directed attention to
the importance of certain strategic materials for national se-
curity, especially oil and gas.5 Congress, using the new deple-
tion provisions as an incentive tool, began to appreciate the
fact that a "prospector for mines or oil and gas frequently
" For example, assume a mineral property's cost was $100,000 and the revenue
generated from that property was $1,000,000. If the depletion deduction was five percent
of revenue, the total depletion deduction would be $50,000 ($1,000,000 x 5%); only half
of the original cost.
" Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756.
Id. § 5, 39 Stat. 756, 759 (applicable to individuals); Id. § 12, 39 Stat. 756, 768
(applicable to corporations). Generally, those provisions stated that for oil and gas wells,
the allowance was to be ascertained by the settled production or regular flow method,
not the flush flow method. For mines, the allowance was just based on a reasonable
amount not to exceed the market value of the year's production.
,9 Revenue Act of 1916, §§ 5(a), 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759, 768.
SO Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-253, 40 Stat. 1057.
See Austin, Percentage Depletion: Its Background and Legislative History, 21
U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 22, 25 (1952).
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expends many years and much money in fruitless search." 52
To entice potential developers to brave the risks of exploration,
the depletion allowance offered was based on the fair market
value of the resource on the date of its discovery, and thus
not limited to just the cost incurred.13 This so called "discovery
clause" created a new, more substantial allowance that could
be claimed only by persons involved in finding mineral deposits
not previously discovered.5 4 New exploration was encouraged
for the well-being and security of the country.
The discovery clause was vague. 5 Because it was vague, it
discriminated to a large extent against the producers of min-
erals such as coal, clay, limestone, and to a lesser extent,
against the prospectors of metallic ore deposits.5 6 The difficulty
involved with coal was that practically all of the coal beds
were already located and mapped by geological surveys, and
therefore, under the post World War I tax provisions, could
not be "discovered" because they were already a "proven
tract." ' 57 In fact, it was noted that "[d]uring the period covered
52 Revenue Bill of 1918, S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 6, reprinted in
1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 117, 120.
" See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
'" See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-253, § 214(a)(10), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067-
68. Section 214(a)(10) provides:
In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber,
a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation of improvements,
according to the peculiar conditions in each case, based upon cost including
cost of development not otherwise deducted: Provided, That in the case of
such properties acquired prior to March 1, 1913 the fair market value of
the property (or the taxpayer's interest therein) on that date shall be taken
in lieu of the cost up to that date: Provided further, That in the case of
mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the taxpayer, on or after March 1,
1913, and not acquired as the result of purchase of a proven tract or lease,
where the fair market value of the property is materially disproportionate
to the cost, the depletion allowance shall be based upon the fair market
value of the property at the date of the discovery, or within thirty days
thereafter... In the case of leases the deductions allowed by this paragraph
shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee....
Id. (emphasis added). Similar wording can be found for corporations, see Id. at §
234(a)(9), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078-79.
11 The discovery clause was vague as to what constitutes a "discovery." For a
more detailed discussion, see Fay The Discovery Clause in Income Tax Laws, Its
Inequities and Abuses, 117 ENGINEERING & MRING JouRNAL-PREss 243 (1924).
%See id.
17 Id. at 243.
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by the [discovery depletion] income tax laws, the Treasury
Department did not allow a single coal 'discovery' valua-
tion. '"58 Most of the other non-metallic minerals faced similar
difficulties. The metallic minerals fared somewhat better.5 9
During the eight-year existence of the discovery depletion
allowance, two changes were introduced which limited the
amount of the deduction a taxpayer could claim for a single
year. 60 Due to the concern that taxpayers could, under the
existing law, offset other non-mining income by the depletion
deduction, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1921, limited the
deduction to the net income derived from the natural resource
property. 6' Three years later, Congress felt that the first limi-
tation was still not sufficient, and that fifty percent of oper-
ating profit would represent a fair limitation. 62 That restriction
58 Id.
19 One of the main inequalities in the discovery clause related to the "same
discovery" issue that benefited only oil and gas prospectors. For example, if a discovery
of an iron-ore deposit was made on one person's property and the geological surveys
demonstrated that all of the surrounding areas (owned by others) contained an extension
of the same deposit, only one "discovery" value was permitted for the original discovery.
The other properties could not then be developed and have a deduction based on
discovery depletion. However, this was not the case for oil and gas pools. After a pool
was discovered, a neighbor could also immediately drill a well (if for no other reason
than to protect his own interest in the pool) and claim the discovery depletion allowance
even if it was an extension of the original pool. "By a judicious handling of the various
wells brought in, it is possible to blanket any pool or oil deposit with 'discovery'
valuations, to the extent that 90 per cent of a pool covering many square miles may be
reported as 'discovery' area for depletion deductions." Id. at 244. The regulations made
this possible by stipulating that a discovery well "proved" an area of 160 acres in the
form of a square, the center being the site of the well. Apparently, in some cases there
was overlapping within the same 160 acres which was technically allowable under the
wording of the law. Therefore, the frustration felt by the natural resource developers
other than oil and gas can be understood. The tax laws were supposed to encourage
exploration and development of all natural resources, but the interpretations were
benefiting to a large extent only developers of oil and gas. To make matters even more
unfair, the fortunate neighbor who saw a successful oil discovery on adjacent property
could set up operations and claim discovery depletion essentially free of the risks that
the discovery clause intended to reward. See generally id. at 234-44. But cf. Tax Division
Defends Discovery Depletion, II MnING CONGRESS J. 597 (1925).
See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
, Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 76-98, § 214(a)(10), 42 Stat. 227, 241
(applicable to individuals); Id. § 234(a)(9), 42 Stat. 227, 256 (applicable to corporations).
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became law with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1924.63
C. Percentage Depletion
Discovery valuation proved cumbersome to administer for
oil and gas wells because a separate valuation had to be made
for each well, 64 and those valuations were costly and difficult
to prove.61 Congress once again reconsidered the existing de-
pletion statutes and introduced changes which accomplished
two important goals. First, the changes simplified compliance
with and administration of the law,66 and second, they curbed
some of the oil and gas developers' abuses of the law that
other natural resource developers thought were unfair. 67 The
percentage depletion provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926 68
achieved those goals.
The 1926 Act initiated the basic structure of the percentage
depletion deduction for oil and gas, and the current tax law
has retained this basic structure. 69 As a replacement for dis-
covery depletion, percentage depletion continued to carry the
possibility of allowing a deduction for more than original cost,
and thus maintained an incentive for exploring and developing
new oil and gas wells.
The original percentage amount allowed for depletion was
twenty-seven and one-half percent of the production income,70
limited by the same fifty percent ceiling provided for under
rN TEa REVENUE ACT OF 1921 BY H.R. 6715 AND THE REA Sos TrEREFoRE, (Comm.
Print 1924); see also Revenue Bill of 1924, H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 241, 254.
61 Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 204(c), 43 Stat. 253, 260.
" Revenue Bill of 1926, H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1926),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 361, 362.
65 Austin, supra note 51, at 26-27.
- Revenue Bill of 1926, supra note 64.
67 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
" Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9.
69 The Revenue Act of 1926 included the following provision:
In the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for depletion shall be 27 1/2
per centum of the gross income from the property during the taxable
year. Such allowance shall not exceed 50 per centum of the net income of
the taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the property,
except that in no case shall the depletion allowance be less than it would
if computed without reference to this paragraph.
Id. at § 204(c)(2), 44 Stat. 9, 16.
30 Id.
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the 1924 Act. 7' The twenty-seven and one-half figure was ac-
tually a compromise between the House of Representatives and
the Senate, derived from a congressionally supervised study on
discovery value amounts. 72 The House committee recom-
mended an allowance of twenty-five percent while the Senate
recommended thirty percent. 73 The final result was a straight
average between the two. Initially, this percentage depletion
allowance pertained only to oil and gas resources, however,
the Revenue Act of 1932 extended the allowance to coal, metal
mines, and sulfur.
74
Several depletion tax cases were decided by the Supreme
Court during the 1910's and 1920's. Each covered a specific
topic which reflected both the taxpayers' and the government's
uncertainty in dealing with a new tax system." For example,
one case involved the issue of whether a lessee of hard minerals
was entitled to a depletion deduction.7 6 At the time the case
was decided, the general understanding was that only a hard
mineral fee owner was entitled to depletion, even though it
had been an accepted fact that an oil and gas lessee could
claim the deduction. 77 This distinction was premised on the
assumption that hard mineral interests were different from oil
and gas interests.
In 1925, the Court recognized for the first time that an
interest acquired by a lessee to exclusively remove the resource,
thereby reducing it to ownership, represented depletable
71 Cf. Revenue Act of 1924, § 204(c), 43 Stat. 253, 260.
72 See Baker, supra note 42, at 271; see also Austin, supra note 51, at 27.
11 See Revenue Bill of 1926, H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 at 31
(1926), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 361, 362-63; Internal Revenue Bill of 1926, S.
REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1926), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 332, 345-
46.
, Revenue Act of 1932, § 114(b)(4), 47 Stat. 169, 203. Section 114(b)(4) stated
that the rates for depletion were: coal, 5%; metal mines, 15%; and, sulfur, 23%. Id.
71 See Mahin, Legal Problems in Connection With Percentage Depletion, 21 U.
KAN. CrTY L. REv. 31 (1952) (providing a discussion of Stratton's Independence v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)); Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S. 503
(1917); U.S. v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103
(1916); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet,
287 U.S. 299 (1932); Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U.S. 301 (1931).
76 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 368 (1925).
7' See Baker, supra note 42, at 278.
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''property. ' 7 The Court noted that the term "property" as
used in the statutes did not appear to be limited to a legal title
ownership. 79 A depletion interest, the value of which decreases
as the mineral is removed, was the salient issue addressed by
the Court. 0 Previous opinions were limited to discussions of
fee interests.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST CONCEPT
The equitable apportionment of the depletion allowance
between a lessor and a lessee had been supported by the Su-
preme Court"' and included in the Revenue Act of 1918.2
Subsequently, the issue became how the depletion allowance
would be apportioned between sublessors and sublessees, be-
cause the Internal Revenue Service (Service) had disapproved of
the depletion deduction to a sublessor who retained an over-
riding royalty interest.8 3 This ruling demonstrated that the
statutes, at that time, had not specifically addressed the ques-
tion of depletion in every conceivable type of transaction.
Thus, guidance was necessary to establish the requisite condi-
tions for the depletion deduction apportionment.
A. Palmer v. Bender 84
In 1933, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of
economic interest which had the effect of broadening the avail-
ability of the depletion deduction. The Court, in Palmer v.
Bender,85 stated:
78 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 369-71 (1925). Lynch arose under
the Revenue Act of 1916 which made no provision for apportioning the depletion
deduction between the lessor and lessee. Id.
79 Id.
-o G.C.M. 2270, 6-2 C.B. 216, 217-218 (1927).
" See Lynch, 267 U.S. 364.
11 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-253, 40 Stat. 1057.
83 G.C.M. 8650, 9-2 C.B. 214, 221 (1930), repealed by G.C.M. 11,822, 12-1 C.B.
229 (1933).
- 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
8, Id.
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[t]he language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at
least, for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by
investment, any interest in the oil in place, and secures, by
any form of legal relationship, income derived from the
extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of
his capital.
8 6
Thus, if there is a natural resource investment which by its
nature can only be recovered through extraction and sale,
depletion should be allowed. The investment, or "value," is
depleted as the resource is removed. Even though technical
ownership of the mineral might not be acquired before sever-
ance, a valuable, legal interest may be obtained."7
In Palmer, the taxpayer was a member of two partnerships
which acquired unproven oil and gas leases. Subsequent drill-
ing led to the discovery of oil, and the properties were then
transferred to other parties in exchange for both immediate
cash bonuses and future payments out of the oil production
revenues. 8 Taking the position that the transfer was a sublease,
the taxpayer deducted depletion based on the discovery value
from his bonus and royalty shares.8 9 The government's position
was based on the theory that a sale of the mineral interest had
occurred, and therefore the depletion allowance, which was
much higher than the cost of the leases, should not be per-
mitted. 90 The Court decided in favor of the taxpayer, and
Palmer was considered to be a sublessor who had neither held
a fee ownership in the land nor performed the extraction
operation.9 1 Although the taxpayer's only activity was receiving
royalties from the operators and paying royalties to the land
owners, this did not prevent him, as a sublessor, from pos-
sessing a depletable interest. As more oil was extracted, the
value of the interest decreased. "Economic interest" was there-
" Id. at 557. This quote has generally been incorporated into the Treasury regu-
lations. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Palmer, 287 U.S. at 558.
Id. at 553.
'9 Id. at 555. Palmer arose under the discovery depletion provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1921.
o Id. at 553-54.
91 Id. at 558-59.
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fore established as a very broad concept which contained the
feature of encouraging taxpayers to explore and develop nat-
ural resource property.
92
B. Thomas v. Perkins 91
With the issue of a lessee's entitlement to depletion having
been settled earlier in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 94 a new
aspect arose concerning a lessee's reportable gross income. The
taxpayer in Thomas v. Perkins95 was an assignee who paid a
sum of money to the assignors out of the oil produced. The
main question before the Court was whether the amounts paid
to the assignors should be included in the taxpayer's gross
income (subject to depletion). 96 The Court found that the
income at issue belonged to the assignors due to their retention
of an economic interest, and therefore should not be included
in the assignee's gross income.
97
Thomas resolved the reverse side of the issue addressed in
Palmer v. Bender.9 The taxpayer in Palmer was in effect an
assignor retaining an oil payment in addition to a cash bonus
and a royalty interest. Since that assignor was found to possess
an economic interest, depletion was allowed against the taxable
income. 99 In Thomas, the Court reasoned that if such income
was considered depletable gross income to an assignor, then
such income, for depletion purposes, should not be linked to
the assignee. o
C. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co. 1° 1
Palmer v. Bender'02 established the two main factors used
to determine economic interest; however, many questions sur-
91 Id. The encouragement stems from the fact that income tax liability may be
reduced significantly when a deduction is allowed which is greater than the original cost.
9 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
- 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
95 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
- Id. at 658.
Id. at 663.
9' 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
Id. at 558.
,00 Thomas, 301 U.S. at 663.
03 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
302 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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rounding these factors began to arise. Considering the first
factor, what exactly did the Court mean by an "investment"?
Since the investment does not have to result in actual owner-
ship in the mineral before extraction, the possibility existed
that any related interest of the producing property could be
considered an investment. However, in Helvering v. Bankline
Oil Co.,103 the Court did not construe the investment factor to
have such a liberal application. The Court stated:
[t]he phrase 'economic interest' is not to be taken as em-
bracing a mere economic advantage derived from production,
through a contractual relation to the owner, by one who has
no capital investment in the mineral deposit.-°
In Bankline Oil, the taxpayer was a processor of natural
gas but was not involved in the actual well production.0 5 The
taxpayer did, however, install and maintain pipelines directly
connected to the wells through which the producers agreed to
deliver wet gas produced at the well. 1° The taxpayer processed
the wet gas by separating the gasoline from the dry gas.
0 7
Upon sale of the gasoline, the taxpayer remitted thirty-three
and one-third percent of the gross proceeds to the well pro-
ducers. 0 8 The income involved here came solely from, and was
dependent on, the natural resource. 0 9 If production declined,
the taxpayer's income also declined.
The taxpayer made an investment in equipment related
directly to the well and looked solely to the well's production
for income. The Court, however, found that the requisite
investment "in the mineral in place" was not met." 0 The
taxpayer's investment was in equipment, not the mineral."'
There was no control over the mineral before or during the
extraction process." 2 The gas was received for processing only
.03 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
to Bankline Oil, 303 U.S. at 367.
105 Id.
116 Id. at 365.
103 Id.
'0 Id.
,o Id. at 368.
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after production."1 3 Thus, an economic advantage was obtained
through the contractual relationship, but such a relationship
was not sufficient to establish an economic interest because
there was no in-place mineral interest prior to extraction." 4
D. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co."5
The Court's first direct decision on a net profits interest
issue resulted in a very confusing outcome. In Helvering v.
Elbe Oil Land Development Co.,116 the taxpayer transferred
oil and gas properties in exchange for an immediate lump sum
cash payment, other stated payments for four years, and an
additional payment equal to one-third of the profits after the
transferee was reimbursed for all operating expenditures. "1 7 The
transferor seemed to have retained a net profits interest coupled
with advanced royalties, giving him a retained economic
interest." 8 The Court, however, stated that the additional
payments received out of the net profits were proceeds of a
"personal covenant" of the transferee, causing a sale rather
than a lease by the taxpayer." 9 The correctness and continued
validity of the Elbe Oil case has been questioned. 20
E. Anderson v. Helvering'
2'
Anderson v. Helvering 22 demonstrates the importance of
the requirement that income come only from extraction and
production. Income from extraction and production comprises
the second factor in the economic interest definition. In An-
derson, the vendee acquired certain royalty interests, fee inter-
3 Id.
114 Id.
"5 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
11 Id.
,, Id. at 374.
Is Id. at 376.
19 Id. at 375.
11 See Baker, supra note 42. Baker states: "to the extent that the Court regarded
the assignee's net profits agreement in the Elbe cases to be simply a personal covenant
rather than an economic interest in the oil in place retained by the assignor, the case is
wrong and no longer good law." Id. at 292.
.2, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
in Id.
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ests, and deferred oil payments.2 3 Consideration received
included specific cash payments payable to the vendor out of
one-half of the gas production. 24 The consideration could have
been payable out of proceeds from the sale of the fee title of
the property if actually sold. This alternative method of re-
munerating the vendor established a potential source of income
other than production, leading the Court to find that the
vendor did not receive depletable income.2 5 The case, there-
fore, turned on the reservation of the additional type of se-
curity and meant that the income could not be considered as
derived "solely" from production. 2 6 The vendee was then
required to include the payments made to the vendor in gross
income. Apparently, the Court felt that no other potential
source of income should be available because the risk of pro-
duction, which percentage depletion was to reward, would then
be minimized.1
27
F. General Council Memorandum 22730
The Service took the opportunity to present an historical
outline of the economic interest concept. In General Council
Memorandum 22730,128 the Service discussed the major eco-
nomic interest cases to date, along with the Supreme Court's
reasoning behind the decisions and how they were used to
develop the tax application of depletion allowances. In the
memorandum, the Service recognized that in Palmer v. Bender 29
the Court refused to distinguish between sublessors and assig-
nors of interests who retain an interest in the mineral produc-
tion. 30 As long as the interest was tied to the mineral in place
and the return was not guaranteed until production, the risk
was still shared. In addressing advance bonus payments, Gen-
eral Council Memorandum 22730 stated that if future pay-
I ld. at 404.
'u Id. at 405.
' Id. at 412.
126 Id.
7 Anderson, 310 U.S. at 413.
SG.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
9 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
33 G.C.M. 22,730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 215.
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ments out of mineral proceeds were present, the bonus was
nothing more than an advance royalty and not a capital asset
sale.' Depletion, therefore, was allowable.
13 2
G. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner3 '
In Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,3 4 the Court
found an economic interest present in a share of the net profits
realized from production which was accompanied by royalty
payments.' 35 The taxpayer owned a fee simple title to land and
leased it to developers. 3 6 The Service recognized the right of
depletion as applicable to bonuses and royalties based on gross
proceeds but denied depletion on revenue from a net profits
sharing agreement. 13 7 This position was based on the reasoning
that a net profits interest is not the same as an in-place mineral
investment interest. 3 ' The Court concluded that a net profits
interest and a royalty based on gross proceeds were one in the
same, and depletion could be taken. 3 9
H. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner
140
The next related concept addressed by the Court concerned
a net profits interest without an accompanying royalty interest.
The taxpayer in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner
141
acquired a lease for consideration of only a fifty percent net
profits interest from operations. 42 Notwithstanding the out-
come of Helvering v. Elbe Oil Development Co. ,41 the Court
ruled that an economic interest was retained by the grantor
" Id. at 217.
132 Id.
326 U.S. 599 (1946).
"3 Id.
Id. at 607.
36 Id. at 601.
"I Id. at 602.
" Id. at 606.
119 Kirby Petroleum, 326 U.S. at 607.
', 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
- Id.
142 Id. at 26.
', 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
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and payments made under the agreement were not to be in-
cluded in the grantee taxpayer's income.' 44 The fine line drawn
between Burton-Sutton and Elbe Oil was due to the grantors'
retained control over the operations.
145
Since the term "economic interest" was introduced and
defined by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Bender,1 46 the only
guidance regarding economic interest being given in this area
was from the judicial system. Unfortunately, the guidance
always resulted from a conflict between a taxpayer and the
Service, a conflict which might otherwise have been avoided
with a more comprehensive tax. With the decision in Burton-
Sutton, the income factor in the economic interest definition
was made more certain and, generally, more favorable to the
taxpayer. The issues of gross income, bonuses, royalties, and
net profits interest were settled by the Supreme Court.
The main issues then turned to the definition's other factor:
investment. Although the Court had already addressed the
investment issue, 47 the following cases demonstrate the contin-
ued uncertainty surrounding the economic interest concept.
These cases demonstrate the Court's emphasis that both sides
of the definition are required to establish an economic interest,
and that Palmer has remained applicable in the various natural
resource arrangements.
Burton-Sutton, 328 U.S. at 36.
', See id. at 38. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
[n]othing better illustrates the gossamer lines that have been drawn by this
Court in tax cases than the distinction made in the Court's opinion between
Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Co., 303 U.S. 372, and this case. To draw
such distinctions, which hardly can be held in the mind longer than it takes
to state them, does not achieve the attainable certainty that is such a
desideratum in tax matters, nor does it make generally for respect of law.
Perhaps it is inherent in the scheme which Congress has provided for
review of tax litigation that we have such an unsatisfactory series of
decisions as those which are sought to be reconciled by the present opinion.
If so, then the call for legislation voiced in responsible quarters to reform
the situation may well be heeded.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1- 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933).
47 See Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
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L Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.'48
In a unique case, the investment factor seemingly became
more liberal. In Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.,"
49
economic interest was found to be present even though there
was neither investment in the land containing the mineral nor
ownership of a leasehold granting any mineral interest.' 50
Under California law at the time of the case, certain off-
shore oil could only be extracted by slant drilling from adjacent
upland sites.' 5 ' Southwest agreed to pay the upland owners
twenty-four and one-half percent of the net profits for the use
of their land as drilling sites.5 2 The upland owners did not
make a cash investment in, nor have any right to drill for,
offshore oil, both of which were possessed by Southwest upon
acquisition of the lease through the bidding process.' 53 The
upland owners were not involved in the drilling operations and
therefore were not subject to any of the risk. In fact, their
only contribution was to allow the use of their land for the
whipstock drilling. 15
4
The Supreme Court allowed the owners percentage deple-
tion based on royalties paid to them by Southwest, the oil
developer. The Court found that under the circumstances, the
upland owners possessed the requisite economic interest.'55 In
applying the definition's factors, the Court recognized that for
the first time it was considering a case in which a fee owner
of adjoining lands was claiming a depletion allowance. 5 6 In
prior cases, the taxpayer at some point in time had at least a
fee or leasehold interest in the producing property. 5 7 Never-
theless, absence of ownership, plus absence of the right to
drill, did not constitute lack of investment for economic inter-
--- 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
.49 Id.
11o Id. at 316.
I Id. at 310.
152 Id.
M Id.
Southwest Exploration, 350 U.S. at 310.
" Id. at 317.
' Id. at 315.
I7 d. at 314-15.
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est purposes. The Court reasoned that "the tax law deals in
economic realities, not legal abstractions, and upon closer
analysis it becomes clear that these factors do not preclude an
economic interest in the upland owners."' 8 Since the state
required drilling from shore, the upland owners were placed
in a "controlling" position. 15 9 The contribution of the use of
their land in exchange for a percentage of net profits "was an
investment in the oil in place sufficient to establish their eco-
nomic interest."' 6 The Court's rationale in Southwest Explo-
ration has been applied to surface owners receiving royalties
for the use of their land overlying severed mineral estates.
61
J. Parsons v. Smith 62
Another landmark decision concerning economic interest
was given by the Court in Parsons v. Smith. 163 This case
involved a contract miner under an oral agreement to strip
mine coal and deliver it to the landowner in exchange for a
per-ton fee. 164 The contract was not written because the tax-
payer did not wish to be bound to removing coal for a very
long period. 165 The taxpayer's main business activity was road
,' Id. at 315.
Id. at 310 and 316.
"o Southwest Exploration, 350 U.S. at 316.
l6, See Newton v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Ala. 1984). In Newton,
the taxpayer owned surface rights and attempted to treat income from royalties as §
631(c) income, thus taxed as a capital gain. Id. at 117. The court, however, found that
the taxpayer did not possess an economic interest prior to entering the lease which
provided royalties for the use of the surface. Id. at 117-18. The court made reference
to, but did not rule on, the fact that the Commissioner allowed percentage depletion on
the royalty income and, therefore, economic interest was acquired when the taxpayer
entered into the lease agreement. Id. at 118. The important distinction in Newton is that
a surface owner may not possess an economic interest until a royalty agreement is
contracted, and thus an economic interest is not retained to meet the provisions of §
631(c) to afford capital gains treatment. With the capital gain changes introduced in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, § 631(c) may not be beneficial to taxpayers in the
future. New § 631(c) does allow percentage depletion for any § 631(c) income which is
taxed at ordinary rates. See I.R.C. § 631(c) (West Supp. 1987). See also Omer v. United
States, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964). In Omer, the facts were similar as those in Newton,
and the court reached the same outcome for the taxpayer.
162 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
163 Id.
6 Id. at 217.
- i d. at 216.
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building, which was slack at that time. 166 The taxpayer wished
to discontinue contract mining when road building contracts
became viable again.167 The agreed upon reimbursement per-
ton was raised from time to time to help the contract miner
offset higher wage and material costs. None of the coal could
be delivered or sold to any other party except the landowner. 1
68
An additional point which proved to be a very important issue
subsequent to this case was that the contract was voidable on
a very short (ten-day) notice. 69
The taxpayer took the position that because of his contracts
to mine the coal, and the contribution of equipment, organi-
zation, and skill needed to mine the coal, he had made a
capital investment in, and thus acquired an economic interest
in, the mineral in place. 170 The Court, taking a different view,
listed seven factors which denied economic interest:
(1) The investments were in equipment, all of which was mov-
able-not in the coal in place; (2) The investments in equip-
ment were recoverable through depreciation-not depletion;
(3) The contracts were completely terminable on short notice;
(4) The landowners did not agree to surrender and did not
actually surrender to petitioners any capital interest in the coal
in place; (5) The coal at all times, even after it was mined,
belonged entirely to the landowners, and petitioners could not
sell or keep any of it, but were required to deliver all that they
mined to the landowners; (6) The petitioners were not to have
any part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but were to
be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and delivered; (7) The
petitioners agreed to look only to the landowners for all sums
to become due them under the contracts.' 7'
Even though it provided a set of factors to be used to
-evaluate the possession of economic interest, the Court missed
a crucial opportunity to weigh each factor's importance for
166 Id.
167 Id.
I Parsons, 359 U.S. at 217.
119 Id. The short-notice terminability issue led to the decision in United States v.
Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981). See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
,70 Parsons, 359 U.S. at 223-24.
"I Id. at 225.
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contract miners. Questions remained as to whether any of the
factors outweigh the others, or if a majority, i.e., four out of
seven, being present, dictates economic interest.
K. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner1
72
The Court passed up a second opportunity to indicate what
importance or weight to assign to the Parsons factors in Paragon
Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner.1 3 The Court denied contract
miners percentage depletion because, in its reasoning, the same
seven factors of Parsons were present.174 Even though the
miners here were involved in deep underground mines and had
to cut shafts, build a railroad spur, open ventilation tunnels,
etc., the short-notice terminability factor helped cause the nec-
essary "investment" not to be found. It seemed as though the
Court was saying that at a minimum the right to mine to
exhaustion must be present, or economic interest is not present.
This position was adopted by the Service and incorporated into
several Revenue Rulings.' 75
L. United States v. Swank
76
One of the most recent Supreme Court cases to directly
address the economic interest issue demonstrates that the Court
did not actually intend to attach such importance to short-
notice terminability as the Service and the Tax Court had
assumed. In United States v. Swank,1 77 the terminability factor
alone could no longer be used to negate the possession of
economic interest. 78 The Court acknowledged that neither the
controlling statute nor the regulations make reference to a
172 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
'" Id.
,74 Id. at 634-35.
171 See Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301; Rev.
Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 170; Rev. Rul. 77-341,
1977-2 C.B. 204; Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205. Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99
(modified Rev. Ruls 72-477 & 73-32); (revoked Rev. Rul. 74-506, 74-507, 77-341, & 77-
481).
'17 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
'" Id.
,71 Id. at 585.
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minimum time period. 7 9 Therefore, that factor by itself would
not have caused a different outcome in Parsons or Paragon
Jewel Coal Co. because all of the facts surrounding a partic-
ular case must be examined. I8 0
The Swank decision was considered so important in this
area of taxation that its full text was reprinted in the Internal
Revenue Service's Cumulative Bulletin, 18' and it also led to the
modification and revocation of several prior Revenue Rul-
ings. 8 2 Even after the decision that terminability is not the
determining factor, the application of the economic interest
concept within the contract miner issue is still evolving.' 83 Two
recent Revenue Rulings demonstrate this unsettled aspect.
18 4
'7 Id. at 579.
"a Id. at 583-85.
' Ct. D. 2006, 1981-1 C.B. 373.
112 See Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99 (modifying Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B.
310 and Rev. Ru!. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301); (revoking Rev. Ru!. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B.
178, Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179, Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204, and Rev.
Ru!. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205).
,13 For a detailed discussion of the contract miner issue, see McMahon, Licensees
and Economic Interest in Minerals After Swank and Revenue Ruling 83-160, 72 Ky.
L.J. 787 (1984).
I" In Revenue Ruling 84-88, 1984-1 C.B. 141, the Service held that a taxpayer
would possess an economic interest although the contract to mine coal provided that the
coal was to be delivered only to the owner of the coal properties. The taxpayer and a
property owner entered into an agreement that granted the taxpayer the right to mine
the coal until its exhaustion. Under the agreement, all of the coal was to be delivered
to the property owner who then sold the coal to others. The taxpayer's reimbursement
was based on seventy percent of the sale proceeds, with a stipulated minimum amount
per ton to be received. This minimum amount per ton applied only to a certain number
of tons and was to be paid only if it was greater than seventy percent of the proceeds
on the sales to others, but the minimum amount could not exceed the acutal proceeds.
The taxpayer's position was that of a contract miner who did not at any time, before
or after extraction, have ownership of the coal. Under the factors provided in Parsons
v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959), the ownership issue would tend to impair a contract
miner's possession of an economic interest. The taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 84-88
acquired rights both to mine the coal to exhaustion and look to its sale for an investment
return; thus, an economic interest was present. The taxpayer's income was dependent
upon the market price, and hence a sharing of the risks was retained.
The facts of Revenue Ruling 86-81, 1986-1 C.B. 249 involved a lessor of coal
properties (owner-lessor) who entered into a contract with a coal operator (operator-
lessee) to extract coal for a specified number of years. The operator-lessee was required
to follow plans, maps, and projections provided by the owner-lessor's engineers in an
attempt not to render unextractable an unnecessarily large portion of the coal. The coal
extracted was to be delivered to the owner-lessor in exchange for proceeds at the
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M. Commissioner v. Engle"s5
The decision of the last Supreme Court case to be discussed
was effectively overturned by Congress in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. In Commissioner v. Engle,8 6 the Court ruled that
advanced royalties or bonuses received for oil and gas leases
are subject to depletion regardless of whether there was actual
production of the mineral or not during the year of receipt. 1
87
This position had been an accepted interpretation of tax law
for at least fifty years. 8 1 In arguing its cases, however, the
Service took the position that the Tax Reduction Act of 1975189
dictated that percentage depletion should not be allowed if
there was no production during the year. 90 The Court found
that Congress' original intent behind the provisions had not
changed, 19' and it allowed depletion.
192
prevailing market rate. If the owner-lessor did not want the coal, then he could sell it
to others. Regardless of the disposition of the mineral, the owner-lessor was to receive
two royalty amounts-both based on a percentage of proceeds that the operator-lessee
received for the coal. One royalty was for the production of the coal, and the other was
an engineering royalty. The royalties were compensation for the above plans, maps, and
projections. The Service stated that the operator-lessee possessed an economic interest
and held that the owner-lessor retained an economic interest in the royalty payments,
which were subject to I.R.C. § 631(c). The owner-lessor did not, however, possess an
economic interest in the coal purchased from the operator-lessee. Therefore, the depletion
was not available from the proceeds upon the sale of the coal.
85 464 U.S. 206 (1984).
86 Id.
Id. at 227-28.
188 See Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
89 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26.
Engle, 464 U.S. at 215.
See generally White, Congressional Intent as a Basis for Decision in Commis-
sioner v. Engle, ll. Omo N.U.L. Rav. 289 (1984).
192 Engle, 464 U.S at 210. The advanced royalty or bonus was to be connected to
production at some point. The Engle Court stated:
Even under pre-1975 law, however, depletion deductions eventually had to
be attributable to actual production. Lessors receiving bonus or advanced
royalty income without oil or gas being produced during the life of the
lease have been required to recapture their depletion deductions and restore
the previously deducted amounts to income. See Douglas v. Commissioner,
322 U.S. 275, 285 (1944). Furthermore, since only one percentage depletion
allowance is statutorily authorized for each dollar of oil and gas income,
lessees have always been required to reduce their allowances by any bonuses
or advanced royalties paid to lessors. See Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil
Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934). Thus, prior to 1975, those who held
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Congress, in the 1986 Act, apparently reconsidered its po-
sition on that matter for oil, gas, and geothermal deposits. 93
For any lease bonus, advance royalty, or other amounts paid
without regard to production of the property, percentage de-
pletion is no longer allowable. 94 For future lease arrangements,
lessors should require at least a minimum amount of produc-
tion activity to secure the percentage depletion deduction.
However, cost depletion may still be available.1
95
Over the years, the economic interest concept has usually
been interpreted quite liberally in favor of the taxpayer. As
long as the taxpayer can establish an investment which has a
value that declines with extraction, and the only income source
is based on production and is somehow contingent, economic
interest will be present.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Early Policy Developments
The early discovery depletion provisions embodied policy
considerations adopted by Congress for national security rea-
sons. As discussed previously, the main purpose of the provi-
sions was to encourage the exploration and development of
important natural resources. 96 The discovery provisions, how-
ever, were difficult to administer and were replaced by the
percentage depletion provisions which have remained basically
the same. 197 Percentage depletion carried with it the same in-
centive for the natural resource industry. 98 Those provisions
based the depletion allowance on an amount unrelated to the
economic interests in mineral deposits, large or small, were entitled to a
single percentage depletion deduction for all income from the property,
including lease bonus and advanced royalty income, so long as oil or gas
was eventually extracted from the land.
Id.
193 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 412(a), 100 Stat. 2085.
-- I.R.C. §§ 613(e)(4), 613A(d)(5) (West Supp. 1987).
9, See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (as amended in 1977).
196 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
I" See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 3:75
Tm ECONOMIC INTEREST CONCEPT
property's cost, thereby establishing it as more than just a
capital recovery technique. 199
Economic interest as a concept was introduced as the stand-
ard a taxpayer must reach in order to take advantage of the
preferential treatment afforded the risk takers. The Congres-
sional policy was followed by the Supreme Court decisions
which addressed the issue as it arose in various types of trans-
actions and arrangements.
B. Recent Policy in Tax Reform
Even though the percentage depletion provisions and the
economic interest concept were not altered greatly by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, additional insight into governmental nat-
ural resource taxation policy is contained in some of the tax
reform proposals presented prior to the 1986 Act. Two of
those proposals sought to completely eliminate the percentage
depletion allowance or, at the very least, severely limit its
applicability.
A Treasury Department report2°' released in 1984 recom-
mended repealing the percentage depletion provisions en-
tirely. 201 The main reason given for the proposed change was
that the present percentage depletion statutes encourage exces-
sive development of existing properties instead of encouraging
exploration for new natural resources. 20 2 The "excessive devel-
'" See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United
States v. Swank, 70 Ky. L.J. 23, 28, 84-87 (1981-82).
100 Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, The Treasury
Department Report to the President, Vol. 2 (General Explanation of the Treasury
Department Proposals) (November 1984).
0 Id. at 230.
m The reasons given by the Treasury Department for the proposed change were
stated as follows:
Since percentage depletion may continue to be claimed after all the tax-
payer's costs have been recovered, percentage depletion is best viewed as
a production subsidy, rather than as a method of capital recovery. As a
production subsidy, however, percentage depletion is inefficient. Because
of the relatively lengthy interval between the acquisition of a property and
initial production (if, in fact, the property is ever productive) percentage
depletion encourages excessive development of existing properties, rather
than the exploration new deposits. Moreover, because the allowance is
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opment" term stems from the fact that some operations con-
tinue after the cost of the property has been recovered because
percentage depletion allows a continuing deduction based on
revenue. Allowing the continued deduction, however, parallels
the purpose of percentage depletion; it is not a capital recovery
provision; rather, it is a development incentive tool. Continued
development, therefore, is to be encouraged.
Following the Treasury Department's proposal, the Reagan
Administration proposed similar changes with some slight
modifications. 20 3 The Administration's proposal recognized that
a total repeal of percentage depletion could possibly have a
significant adverse effect on a part of the domestic oil and gas
industry. 204 Percentage depletion, under this proposal, would
have been retained for the so-called "stripper wells" which
produce less than ten barrels a day each but comprise about
fifteen percent of the domestic oil production. 20 1 If these wells
were shut down, this country's dependence on foreign energy
limited to 50 percent of the net income from the property, tax benefits are
cut back for developers of marginal properties. Instead, the greatest ben-
efits are provided to the developers of the most prolific or highly concen-
trated deposits, which would most likely be developed even in the absence
of these benefits.
Even if percentage depletion allowances were limited to capital in-
vested, this method would not be an acceptable capital recovery method.
Such a method would still provide faster capital recovery for owners of
deposits that can be produced more rapidly (even if such production might
represent a smaller fraction of total reserves) than for owners of less
productive properties. Percentage depletion also would provide faster cap-
ital recovery when mineral prices rise, and less rapid recovery when prices
fall. Since the discovery of a particulary prolific deposit or a change in
product prices may be entirely fortuitous, a capital recovery allowance
based on such factors is both capricious and inequitable. Tax simplification
would also be enhanced if taxpayers did not have to determine the per-
centage depletion allowed and the associated tax preference.
Most importantly, cost depletion computed by reference to the tax-
payer's adjusted basis in the property, indexed for inflation, is the equiv-
alent of economic depreciation. Use of this method by the extractive
industries would place them on a recovery allowance system similar to that
employed by other industries.
Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, supra note 200, at 230.
'0 The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and
Simplicity, [May 1985], Oil & Gas Taxes Nat. Res., (P-H) Bull. 5 (June 5, 1985).
w, Id. at 229.
ms Id.
(VOL. 3:75
THE ECONOMIlC INTEREST CONCEPT
would increase, thereby adding to the increasing problem of
the trade deficit. 206 "Stripper wells" were the only exception
provided by the proposed repeal of the percentage depletion
after a five-year phase-out period.
20 7
The reasons for the proposed changes and the concerns of
what their impact might be are very interesting. If the present
tax law encourages the so called "excessive development" of
existing properties, then the initial purpose for having a deple-
tion deduction greater than cost seems to have been met. 20 8 If
important materials are needed for the well-being of the coun-
try, the domestic producing properties should be developed to
the fullest extent before moving to a "new" deposit. Operators
might abandon the property before total resource recovery.
Properties containing abandoned deposits might, in future
years, become more valuable if the demand for domestic pro-
duction increases, thus leading to the resumption of production
from those deposits and re-disturbance of reclaimed lands.
This means that the overall efficiency of natural resource de-
velopment would suffer because the deposits could have been
fully developed. The percentage depletion provisions continue
to promote exploration in addition to full development once a
deposit is located.
V. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INTEREST
There are several alternative methods available to analyze
a specific tax issue, each with its own strengths and limitations.
One method is to assess the status of the issue by examining
and discussing the statutory guidance and the judicial inter-
pretations' application of the statutes to specific taxpayer sit-
uations over time. This is the most common method used in
the tax literature, and was applied in this article. An alternative
w6 Id.
2w Id.
Whether the percentage depletion provisions are actually accomplishing the
intended results is open to question. See generally Landis, The Impact of the Income
Tax Laws on the Energy Crisis: Oil and Congress Don't Mix, 64 CALrF. L. REv. 1040,
1062 (1976); Williams. Some Ingredients of a National Oil and Gas Policy, 27 STA. L.
REv. 969, 975 (1975); Lichtenberg & Norgaard, Energy Policy and the Taxation of Oil
and Gas, 14 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 501, 514-15 (1974).
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method of analysis includes a quantitative assessment of the
particular issue by identifying and evaluating the factors or
variables associated with the issue's outcome. The following
discussion describes a quantitative technique used to analyze
the economic interest concept.
A. Methodology
The use of quantitative techniques is not unknown to the
judicial system. 0 9 The various methods of quantitative analysis
have been applied to many different types of cases.
210 Most of
those applications have been used as supporting evidence in
court proceedings. 211 Other researchers, however, have been
successful in identifying variables during their analysis which
lead to high prediction probabilities of the cases' outcomes.
212
A similar quantitative assessment is presented here to define
the relevant significant variables concerning the economic in-
terest concept.
This analysis involves an examination of all of the Tax
Court and Board of Tax Appeals cases during the time period
For an overview of quantitative analysis, see Barnes, A Common Sense Ap-
proach to Understanding Statistical Evidence, 21 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 809 (1984).
210 See generally Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLum. L.
REv. 702 (1980); Barnes, The Significance of Quantitative Evidence in Federal Trade
Commission Deceptive Advertising Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1983); Rub-
infeld and Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69 (1983); Finkelstein and Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-
Fixing Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (1983); Shoben, The Use of Statistics to
Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (1983).
23, See supra note 210.
232 See Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative
Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1 (1957). Kort studied
the predictability of Supreme Court cases involving the right to counsel issue. A simple
regression model was constructed using fourteen cases as the source group, which then
was applied to a separate set of fourteen cases comprising the test group (hold-out
sample). All cases in the test group Were classified correctly, thus leading Kort to the
conclusion that important factors can be identified from judicial decisions which appear
to have been influential on the judges who were deciding such cases. The information
learned in similar types of court decision analyses could be applied to future cases by
the parties involved, thus providing additional insight on the probabilities of potential
outcomes. See also Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 843 (1961). Nagel utilized mathematical analysis to determine if judges'
political party affiliations appeared to have a relationship to judicial decision-making.
The results supported the conclusions that a judge's party membership tends to influence
a decision in certain areas of the law.
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from 1933 through 1984, in which the possession of an eco-
nomic interest was the main issue. The initial year for the
study was selected, based on the year in which the Palmer v.
Bender"3 decision introduced the economic interest concept.2 " Out
of 259 potentially related Tax Court cases identified, 140 rel-
evant observations were found. 215 These cases are listed in
Appendix 4.
As the Tax Court cases were analyzed, three distinct types
of economic interest issues were detected which call for sepa-
rate models. Defining distinct types of cases provides more
meaningful information. For example, a taxpayer concerned
with obtaining percentage depletion from oil and gas transac-
tions needs information related to that activity, not informa-
tion for structuring transactions to obtain capital gains
treatment when selling hard minerals from owned land. Fur-
ther, some of the cases involving percentage depletion for hard
mineral transactions dealt with contract miner issues which
were not present in any of the oil and gas cases. The four
groups, including three separate types of cases for which ad-
ditional separate logit models were developed are:
Model I - All cases reviewed.
.. 3 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
114 As a first step in identifying the potential cases, the LEXIS retrieval system
from Meade Data Central, Inc., Dayton, Ohio, was used. The cases identified were read
to identify additional cases and insure that they contained the appropriate main issue.
The cases were traced through a citator to identify potential cases and find the final
decision of the cases on appeal.
If an unacceptable portion of the cases possessed a final decision at the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court level which had reversed a decision of the Tax Court, the
validity of this study's results could be questioned. In all, eleven cases were located
which contained such a final dispositon. Since this number was relatively small, those
cases were removed from the study to avoid any contamination of the data used to
identify the significant variables. Thus, only Tax Court cases that were not appealed, or
decisions that were appealed but affirmed upon final appeal, were incorporated into this
study.
2 Some of cases used had decisions where the Tax Court judge addressed the
economic interest issue more than once. These cases involved taxpayers who were
connected with more than just one natural resource transaction arrangement (e.g., more
than one lease agreement), and the court ruled on these arrangements separately. There-
fore, if the presence of economic interest was decided individually, then each arrangement
was treated as a separate observation-giving more observation than cases to this study.
The total number of usable Tax Court cases were 126, which contained a total of 140
observations.
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Model II - Taxpayers attempting to obtain percentage deple-
tion in oil and gas transactions.
Model III - Taxpayers attempting to obtain percentage de-
pletion in hard mineral transactions.
Model IV - Taxpayers attempting to obtain capital gain status
upon natural resource dispositions.
As a final step in this quantitative anaylsis study, the
economic interest cases were grouped according to the decade
in which they were decided. The cases contained in a specific
decade (i.e., 1930s, 1940s, etc.) were then used to identify the
significant variables present during those periods. Comparing
the results between decades and finding differences could pos-
sibly mean that the factors have changed in importance over
time, or that the types of economic interest cases have changed.
The statistical analysis incorporated in this study was a
type of log-linear model termed logit analysis, which builds a
model around a dependent variable and any number of inde-
pendent variables. Logit analysis is an accepted methodology
which has been used in the social sciences. 21 6 In this study, the
presence or absence of economic interest is the dependent
variable, with the independent variables being the factors which
intuitively impact the possession of economic interest. 21 7 The
model contained in the results includes only the variables which
have a statistically significant effect on the economic interest
decision. 21 8 Therefore, the presence of a variable indicates that
216 D. KNoKE & P. BURKE, Loo-Ln EiAR MODELS 5-7 (1980).
117 Factors that are considered as the independent variables in this study were
selected from several sources. I.R.C. §§ 611(a) (West 1967) and 631(b)&(c) (West Supp.
1987) were the starting point for the selection, but it did not prove helpful because no
definition or discussion of economic interest was found. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1, which
contains the definition, did not provide any specific factors, but it did give investment
and income as factors of classification. A third type of category was established for
factors that did not fall under either investment or income.
The related Supreme Court cases previously discussed furnished the initial factors
used as the independent variables. Other sources included the literature in this area and
the actual Tax Court cases used in the analysis. In total, twelve variables were identified
as being potentially salient with respect to the presence or absence of economic interest.
These variables are indicated and discussed in APPENDIX 3.
21 The finding whether there is presence of economic interest does not necessarily
determine whether the decision was favorable to the taxpayer. A cursory review might
lead to the conclusion that any taxpayer in a natural resource transaction would definitely
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the variable possibly had an impact on the decision rendered
by the court. An in-depth discussion of the statistical methods
used in the logit analysis technique is presented in Appendix
5.
B. Results
Using logit analysis on all of the Tax Court observations
together provides the results shown in Model I in Appendix 1.
Having the taxpayer's income tied to the market price
(REVMKT) was found to be the most significant variable
present among the studied cases. This variable should intui-
tively be one of the most important because it relates to the
second factor of the economic interest definition (income), and
demonstrates the necessary contingency which appeared to be
so prevalent. The significance of the four other variables is
indicated by the order in which they are listed. Therefore,
being the actual miner (ACTMIN) and being a fee owner of
the land (OWNER) were the next most important variables.
The results for cases involving only percentage depletion
for oil and gas are shown in Model II. Only two variables
were found to be significant. Having the revenue tied to the
market price (REVMKT) was again the most important varia-
ble. Examination of the hard mineral percentage depletion case
results in Model III demonstrates that a new variable relating
to the term of a contract enters as the second variable. The
significance of this factor is probably associated with the con-
tract miner terminability issue that was finally resolved in the
Swank decision. 2 9 For Model IV, which encompassed the cap-
ital gains cases, the first variable listed pertained to an advance
payment before production (ADVANCE), followed by the
market price variable (REVMKT). Where there was an advance
desire to possess economic interest to have percentage depletion available. Many times,
however, a taxpayer wished to avoid the presence of economic interest and, thus,
percentage depletion. This was the situation where capital gains were desired outside of
1.R.C. § 631(c) (West 1967). In other situations taxpayers might desire not to possess
economic interest because they do not want the income taxable to them, or they want
it treated as a return of capital. So, the success of the taxpayer is not always parallel to
presence of economic interest.
"' See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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payment, the tendency was to find that economic interest was
not possessed by the taxpayer because the income was less
contingent.
Appendix 2 reveals the results for cases according to the
decade in which they were decided, and, as can be seen, the
variables included in the models differed substantially from
period to period. The only variable consistently appearing in
the models was the most important one discussed above, the
market price (REVMKT). That variable's prominence demon-
strates that it has been consistently applied by Tax Court
judges over a long period of time and a wide range of cases.
During the 1960s, however, the most significant variable
(TERM) related to the term of the natural resource arrange-
ments at issue in those cases. The decisions in that decade
followed the Parsons decision which indicated that the termin-
ability factor was influential in the finding of an economic
interest. 220 During that time period, the Tax Court had agreed
with the Service that a short-term contract could, by itself,
negate possession of an economic interest. That position, of
course, is no longer correct.
22'
In view of the differences among the variables examined
over the time periods, a conclusion might be reached that the
Tax Court was not consistent in applying the variables. Ex-
amination of the types of economic interest cases heard by the
court indicates, however, that another more probable reason
exists. Also, Appendix 2 provides a breakdown of the cases
by type for each decade. This breakdown shows that most of
the oil and gas percentage depletion cases were decided early,
while the hard mineral and capital gains cases arose in the
later years. Apparently, the oil and gas issues on economic
interest generally became a settled area after the first two
decades, with the other types of cases starting to appear at a
later date.
One possible reason for such a pattern of cases is that the
discovery depletion provisions were not utilized much by the
hard mineral developers, who did not obtain the benefit of
2" See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
n' See supra notes 176, 181-82 and accompanying text.
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percentage depletion until 1932.222 The oil and gas developers,
on the other hand, took advantage of the generous allowances
starting in earlier years.
The results of the quantitative analysis support the conclu-
sion that the Tax Court has generally applied factors in such
a way as to promote the policy established by Congress in the
early revenue acts.223 The market price variable appeared as
the most dominant of all, demonstrating the importance of the
income factor of the economic interest definition. The invest-
ment factor, however, is also required and its variables were
also included as significant. By observing the change in the
types of cases over the period involved in this study, it can be
seen that some areas are more settled, and, therefore, more
certain for planning purposes than others.
CONCLUSION
In deciding the issue of whether an economic interest is
present, Congress indicated that the risk incurred by the pro-
ducer was to be rewarded as a means to encourage the explo-
ration and development of new resources. That encouragement,
introduced as discovery depletion, was initially offered as nat-
ural resources became identified as essential for the country's
well-being. Since the discovery depletion provisions were dif-
ficult to administer, percentage depletion followed as a substi-
tute. Further, because the deduction could exceed the actual
cost incurred, the policy feature was retained.
The evolution of economic interest has not changed the
policy of encouraging the exploration and development of new
resources, rather it has evolved as a means to apply that policy
to the complicated transactions contracted to by taxpayers.
The Supreme Court has, almost without exception, rendered
decisions to keep the encouragement available to those taxpay-
ers who indeed incur the risk. As future tax reform proposals
emerge, Congress will have to decide if past policy is still
relevant to the demands of natural resources.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 50, 68 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Summary of Stepwise Results































*The order of the listed variables indicates each'variable's level of signif-
icance as it relates to the presence or absence of economic interest.
**The classification accuracy is found by using the combination of the
variables given for a model to classify the Tax Court cases used to find the
significant variables.
Summary of Stepwise Results for Percentage Depletion






0 - - - 53.111 0.001
1 REVMKT 37.108 0.000 16.003 0.855






THE ECONOMIC INTEREST CONCEPT
Summary of Stepwise Results for Percentage




























1 ADVANCE 4.212 0.040 23.600 0.169














Variables Entered by Decade
Decade
1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s*
I REVMKT REVMKT REVMKT TERM MINOWN
2 INVEST BUSACT GUARSLACTMIN




Cases 17 37 22 34 30
*Includes cases in the 1980s.
Summary of Results by Decade
Measure 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s
Goodness-of-fit








94.607o 100.007 o 79.407o
Types of Cases by Decade







Capital Gains 0 3
Other 0 1
Totals 17 37
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APPENDIX 3
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable 1. OWNER - Taxpayer was fee owner of the land containing the
natural resource.
In Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co. ,24 the Supreme Court
stated that it was considering for the first time a situation where an owner of
adjoining land, not even possessing a leasehold in the natural resource, was
allowed an economic interest.- That case was not representative of most other
cases. It did, however, stress that ownership or a right to the mineral is an
important, though not necessary, criterion.- If a taxpayer at some point in
time was a fee owner of the land containing the natural resource, then this
fact would be beneficial in establishing an in-place mineral investment.
Variable 2. TERM - The length of the arrangement was greater than, or less
than, one year.
During the time period between Parsons v. Smith 27 and United States v.
Swank= the Tax Court treated the short-notice clause as very important in
establishing an investment. Even though the Swank decision declared that such
importance should not be attached to terminability, this variable was in fact
used for a period of time, even possibly preceding Parsons. Terminability,
therefore, is included as a variable to determine its significance as a factor in
the history of economic interest cases.
Upon examination of some of the cases, the Tax Court appeared to
carefully scrutinize the short-notice clause in cases which included an arrange-
ment with the term under one year. The main concern of the court was that
the miner should have sufficient time to extract substantially all of the resource.
Given this concern, the one-year mark will be the cutoff for the terminability
factor.
Variable 3. INVEST - Investment in roads, immovable equipment, or structures
was made by the taxpayer.
Depletion for tax purposes is a deduction allowed for the decline in value
of an in-place mineral investment. To establish what the investment consists
of, the cost of the resource and the cost of preparing the property for
development is considered. If a cost was subject to depreciation, depletion
would not be available for that cost as a means of capital recovery.
", 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
22 Id. at 315.
'Id.
u 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
451 U.S. 571 (1981).
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The Court in Parsons v. Smith-' identified cost recovery as a factor to
be considered through depreciation rather than depletion. "20 In that case, the
contract miners' investment was solely in moveable equipment recoverable
through depreciation.231 In other types of cases, investments in roads, immov-
able equipment, and structures relating to only one mine location would be
considered an additional investment in the mineral in place due to the nature
of the expenditure. Therefore, since this factor has been identified by the
Supreme Court, it will be treated as an independent variable.
Variable 4. OWNEXT - Ownership of the mineral at time of extraction.
When trying to evaluate the investment factor of the economic interest
definition, the courts look for an element of control over the resource. That
control may be control over the mineral immediately upon extraction. Own-
ership of the mineral before it is sold demonstrates a taxpayer's investment to
be recovered from the mineral sale.
The Parsons Court made reference to the fact that the contract miners
did not own the mineral after extraction. Ownership of the mineral at all times
remained in the landowners, who later sold the coal. The miners' investment
in labor and other expenses, therefore, did not lead to their ownership.
Ownership of the coal after extraction is not considered as mandatory for
the presence of economic interest. The type of arrangement involved must be
examined. For example, a taxpayer Who transfers a working interest while
retaining an overriding royalty or a net profits interest, will not own the
mineral upon extraction. That taxpayer, providing the other necessary require-
ments are met, possesses an economic interest. Nevertheless, the existence of
ownership of the mineral upon extraction would help support an economic
interest.
Variable 5. GUARSL - Guaranteed quantity the taxpayer must sell.
The income factor of the economic interest definition provides that the
income must transpire from mineral extraction and sale. This requisite has
been an obstacle for many taxpayers who wish not to possess an economic
interest. If a taxpayer owning land containing a natural resource, which is a
capital asset, enters into an agreement to sell the mineral, then capital gain
treatment would presumably be the objective. The arrangement must specify
the quantity or the taxpayer is deemed to be a lessor; thus, he retains economic
interest because the quantity was measured in connection with the extraction
process. This factor was initially noticed in O'Connor 212 and was detected in
many other cases involving capital gains.
359 U.S. 215.
2So Id. at 255.
21 Id. at 217.
"2 O'Connor v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
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Variable 6. MINOWN - Mineral Goes to the original land or lease owner.
In all cases, the courts made reference to the final disposition of the
mineral.21 If the mineral was returned to the original owner of the land
containing the resource, or to the owner of a lease with interest in the mineral,
then close scrutiny of the income side of the definition was applied. This
factor is included in this study to determine if the final disposition of the
mineral was significant.
Variable 7. MINPMT - Minimum received guaranteed payment.
One part of the policy goals behind percentage depletion is to reward the
risky nature of the exploration and development of the mineral. If that risk is
somehow offset within the structure of the arrangement, then the presence of
economic interest is questioned.3 A guaranteed payment to the taxpayer would
have such an effect.
The information for this variable is traced to the actual contract, if any,
which establishes the amount of revenue the taxpayer receives. If a certain
dollar amount is guaranteed to be paid to the taxpayer, regardless of produc-
tion, then this variable will be considered to be present. This factor is not the
same as a production payment which states that a certain dollar amount is
payable out of future production. A production payment is not guaranteed-
it relies on the actual production. Therefore, this factor looks at an amount
to be paid in the future without regard to production.
Variable 8. ADVANCE - Advance payment before production.
Many contracts in the natural resource taxation area stipulate an imme-
diate cash payment in addition to other future consideration.35 This immediate
pre-production payment would contribute to the reduction of risk; thus, the
taxpayer might be presumed to have not looked to extraction for a source of
income. Given other facts present in such cases entailing advance payments,
such payments are sometimes classified as advance royalties, and other times
as proceeds from a sale.
Variable 9. REVSING - Single source of revenue.
Another factor which relates to the inherent nature of risk within the
second factor of the economic interest definition is the source of the taxpayer's
revenue. The taxpayer is supposed to look to the sale of the mineral for the
revenue and, accordingly, the source of that revenue is presumably important.
" See, e.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959); United States v. Swank, 451
U.S. 571 (1981).
2M See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
"I See Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co., 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
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Having revenue received from only one party instead of several would point
towards a reduction of risk. 6 If an arrangement provided that all of the
taxpayer's mineral be sold to one party, then the courts might surmise that
the evidence suggests the presence of guaranteed income. Consequently, the
existence of economic interest would also be in doubt.
Variable 10. REVMKT - Revenue tied to the market price.
For a taxpayer whose revenue is tied directly to the price of the mineral
on the market, such uncertainty indeed establishes a high degree of risk. The
taxpayer is at the mercy of uncontrollable economic influences whereby there
is no guarantee for recouping his investments. Therefore, presence of this
variable helps support the possession of economic interest.
The forms of arrangements which are tied to the market price are varied.
Lessors may receive revenue based on a market price per ton, reserve a
fractional royalty based on gross sales, or retain a net profits interest. Lessees
who have control of the mineral after extraction can sell on the market or to
a single purchaser at rates contingent on market prices. Other combinations
are also possible. In the cases analyzed, if the revenue of the taxpayer was
tied directly to the market price of the mineral, then presence of this factor
was indicated.
Variable 11. BUSACT - Main business activity.
The Tax Court might consider other types of factors when deciding
whether or not economic interest is present. The court is to look at the
substance of the arrangement to apply the intent of Congress regarding both
capital recovery and exploration and development encouragement. In doing
so, the main business activity of a taxpayer may be a key factor in a case
which has a high degree of uncertainty as to its outcome. In this situation, the
court might consider that a taxpayer whose livelihood depends almost entirely
on natural resource production deserves the benefit of the doubt and should
be rewarded for the risk involved. On the other hand, a taxpayer whose natural
resource connection is merely a sideline business, or possibly a tax shelter,
might not receive the same disposition from the court. In Parsons v. Smith,2"
the taxpayer trying to claim the presence of economic interest was a road
builder by trade, and the contract mining was temporary. In United States v.
Swank,238 the taxpayer was in business as a mine operator.23
9
Variable 12. ACTMIN - Taxpayer was the actual miner.
Whether the taxpayer was the actual miner might have some influence
over the decision with reasons similar to those of the preceding variable. While
236 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
.17 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
238 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
2139 Id. at 572.
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at first glance variables 11 and 12 look similar, they are in fact not the same
in many of the observed cases. For example, an oil company owning many
leases might sublease some of them to others who perform the actual drilling
and operating. In addition, situations occur where taxpayers who are not in
the business of extracting natural resources use heavy equipment to strip mine
coal in periods of slack activity. This was the case in Parsons v. Smith,
'
M
where the taxpayer was in the business of road building. Because of these
types of cases, variables 11 and 12 are not one and the same.
- 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
1981
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APPENDIX 4
ECONOMIC INTEREST TAX COURT CASES
The following cases were used in the economic interest analysis:
Adkins, 51 T.C. 957 (1969); Albritton, 24 T.C. 903 (1955); Badger Oil Co.,
42 B.T.A. 521 (1940); Bankers Mortgage Co., 1 T.C. 1258 (1943); Bankline
Oil Co., 33 B.T.A. 910 (1936); Barry, Par. 55,012 P-H Memo TC (1955);
Beach Petroleum Corp., Ltd., par. 46,192 P-H Memo TC (1946); Blake, 20
T.C. 721 (1953); Bolling, 37 T.C. 754 (1962); Burke, 5 T.C. 1167 (1945);
Caldwell Oil Corp., 47 B.T.A. 707 (1942); Carl Maier Syndicate, Par. 46,226
P-H Memo TC (1946); Clifton, Par. 58,065 P-H Memo TC (1958); Cline, 67
T.C. 889 (1977); Collins, 56 T.C. 1074 (1971); Cook Drilling Co., 38 B.T.A.
291 (1938); Cooper, 39 T.C. 253 (1962); Costantino, Par. 70,043 P-H Memo
TC (1970); Crawford, Par. 44,098 P-H Memo TC (1944); Cullen, 41 B.T.A.
1054 (1940); Dann, 30 T.C. 499 (1958); Day, 54 T.C. 1417 (1970); Dearing,
et. al., 36 B.T.A. 843 (1937); Desrosiers, Par. 62,047 P-H Memo TC (1962);
Donnell, 48 T.C. 552 (1967); Elbe Oil Land Development Co., 34 B.T.A. 333
(1936); Esperson, Par. 41,086 P-H Memo TC (1941); F. & G. Sand and Gravel
Co., Inc., Par. 76,360 P-H Memo TC (1976); Felix Oil Company, Par. 42,662
P-H Memo TC (1942); Fink, 29 T.C. 1119 (1958); Fleming, Par. 72,155 P-H
Memo TC (1972); Fleming, 43 B.T.A. 229 (1941); Gap Anthracite Co., Par.
72,189 P-H Memo TC (1972); Glenn, 39 T.C. 427 (1962); Godbold, 82 T.C.
73 (1984); Godshall, 13 T.C. 681 (1949); Gray, 13 T.C. 265 (1949); Green, 35
T.C. 1065 (1961); Hair, Par. 67,022 P-H Memo TC (1967); Hamme, Par.
53,100 P-H Memo TC (1953); Hammonds, 38 B.T.A. 4 (1938); Hansen, Par.
75,343 P-H Memo TC (1975); Hardesty, 43 B.T.A. 245 (1941); Harrington,
48 T.C. 939 (1967); Herndon Drilling Co., 6 T.C. 628 (1946); Holbrook, 65
T.C. 415 (1975); Holloway, 10 T.C. 1045 (1948); Hudson, 11 T.C. 1045 (1945);
Hugh Hodges Drilling Co., 43 B.T.A. 1045 (1941); Ima Mines Corp., 32 T.C.
1360 (1959); Iske, Par. 80,061 P-H Memo TC (1980); Island Creek Coal Co.,
30 T.C. 70 (1958); Ison, Par. 63,308 P-H Memo TC (1963); Jahn, 58 T.C.
452 (1972); Jantzer, 32 T.C. 161 (1959); Japhet, 3 T.C. 86 (1944); Johnson,
Par. 63,321 P-H Memo TC (1963); Jones, 31 B.T.A. 55 (1934); Kasey, 33
T.C. 656 (1960); Kennedy Mining & Milling Co., 43 B.T.A. 617 (1941); Kiesau
Petroleum Corp., 42 B.T.A. 69 (1940); Kirby Petroleum Co., 2 T.C. 1258
(1943); Kittle, 21 T.C. 79 (1953); Laird, 35 B.T.A. 75 (1936); Landreth, 50
T.C. 803 (1968); Langenfelder, 69 T.C. 378 (1977); Lawson, Par. 63,179 P-H
Memo TC (1963); Lawton, 33 T.C. 47 (1959); Lee, 42 B.T.A. 1217 (1940);
Legg, 39 T.C. 30 (1962); Lesher, 73 T.C. 340 (1979); Louisiana Land and
Development Co., 6 T.C. 172 (1946); Majestic Oil Corp., 42 B.T.A. 659
(1940); Matagorda, 29 T.C. 1060 (1958); McCall, 37 T.C. 674 (1962); McCall,
27 T.C. 133 (1956); McLean, 41 B.T.A. 565 (1940); Mellen, Par. 63,089 P-H
Memo TC (1963); Merritt, 39 T.C. 257 (1962); Missouri River Sand Co., 83
T.C. 193 (1984); Mullins, 48 T.C. 571 (1967); Murchison, 28 B.T.A. 257
(1933); Murphy, 6 T.C. 294 (1946); North Range Mining Co., 46 B.T.A. 296
(1942); O'Connor, 78 T.C. 1 (1982); Olinger, 27 T.C. 93 (1956); Pacific Cement
& Aggregates, Inc., 31 T.C. 36 (1958); Pearl Oil Co., 40 B.T.A. 147 (1939);
Pleasanton Gravel Co., 64 T.C. 510 (1975); Pockrandt, Par. 62,260 P-H Memo
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TC (1962); Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 7 T.C. 685 (1946); Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., Par. 46,041 P-H Memo TC (1946); Puckett, Par. 64,040 P-H Memo
TC (1964); Ramey, 47 T.C. 363 (1967); Rawco, Inc., Ltd., 37 B.T.A. 128
(1938); Reagon, Par. 73,266 P-H Memo TC (1973); Reid, Par. 72,205 P-H
Memo TC (1972); Remer, 28 T.C. 85 (1957); Richards, Par. 59,205 P-H Memo
TC (1959); Ridley, 58 T.C. 439 (1972); Roeser & Pendleton, Inc., 15 T.C. 966
(1950); Romano, Par. 67,071 P-H Memo TC (1967); Rose, 56 T.C. 185 (1971);
Royalton Stone Corp., Par. 66,109 P-H Memo TC (1966); Ruston, 19 T.C.
284 (1952); Sager, Par. 62,121 P-H Memo TC (1962); Schermerhorn Oil Corp.,
46 B.T.A. 151 (1942); Simms, 28 B.T.A. 1050 (1933); Sparkman, Par. 72,201
P-H Memo TC (1972); Standard Oil Co., 54 T.C. 1099 (1970); Stone, 50 T.C.
113 (1968); Strutzel, 60 T.C. 969 (1973); Sutton, 35 B.T.A. 348 (1937); The
Oil City Sand and Gravel Co., 32 T.C. 31 (1959); Trembley, Par. 48,270 P-H
Memo TC (1948); Utah Alloy Ores, Inc., 33 T.C. 917 (1960); Victory Sand
and Concrete, Inc., 61 T.C. 407 (1974); Walker, 55 T.C. 522 (1970); Washburn,
44 T.C. 217 (1965); Weaver, 72 T.C. 594 (1979); Weeks, 31 B.T.A. 623 (1934);
West, 3 T.C. 431 (1944); West Production Co., 41 B.T.A. 1043 (1940); Wilson,
26 T.C. 474 (1956); Wineberg, Par. 61,336 P-H Memo TC (1961); Wood, Par.
68,178 P-H Memo TC (1968)
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APPENDIX 5
DESCRIPTION OF LOGIT ANALYSIS
Logit analysis is just one type of model within the vast area of log-linear
analysis. Log-linear analysis is similar to ordinary regression in several ways,
with both building predictive models. If the dependent variable is coded as
dichotomous rather than on an interval scale, then ordinary regression shows
how the probability of the occurrence of a response is affected by variations
in the independent variable.-4l Log-linear analysis, on the other hand, differs
in that changes in the independent variables do not affect the probability, but
changes do affect conditional odds of the dependent variable.-2
Conditional odds involves the chance that a particular item will fall into
one category, given prior knowledge of its group membership. The following




Voted 485 626 1,111
Not Voted 239 701 940
Total 724 1,327 2,051
The frequency that an individual drawn at random would fall in one category
as opposed to the other is called the basic marginal odds. It is found by
dividing the total voted by the total not voted, or 1,111/940 = 1.18 (just over
one-to-one). Conditional odds are calculated with the prior knowledge of group
membership; therefore, given that an individual is a college graduate, the odds
of having voted relative to not voted would be 485/239 = 2.03, or about two-
to-one. The conditional odds for individuals without a college degree would
be 626/701 = .89, or less than one-to-one. In log-linear analysis, the two
conditional odds would then be compared to arrive at a single summary statistic
called the "odds ratio," which is the workhorse of log-linear models.-,3 For
the above example, the odds ratio is found by dividing the first conditional
odds by the second; thus 2.03/.89 = 2.28. This is interpreted as saying that
the odds on voting are 2.28 times greater among individuals with college degrees
than among individuals without college degrees.
The odds ratio indicates whether relationships exist between variables,
having a lower limit of 0 with no upper limit. An odds ratio of 1 indicates
that no relationship is present between the variables. A ratio of less than 1
indicates a negative relationship, and a ratio of greater than 1 signifies a direct
covariation.
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The general log-linear model does not distinguish variables into independ-
ent and dependent categories because it attempts to find relationships among
all of the variables present. Logit analysis, on the other hand, builds a model
around a dependent variable and any number of independent variables. A
parsimonious logit model will, however, not include all of the independent
variables, and therefore, will not attempt to explain all of the effects on the
dependent variable. A model which does attempt to explain all of the effects
is referred to as "saturated," and would most likely be too cumbersome for
interpretational purposes. The procedure to be used here has the logit model
initially containing no independent variables, with variables then added only
if their inclusion significantly enhances the model's predictability. The variables
are added in the order of the most significant ones first. This is a forward
stepwise selection process. A backward elimination process can also be used,
but is more time-consuming and inefficient since a saturated model is initially
established, and the result would be that variables which do not contribute to
the model's goodness-of-fit are eliminated.
The logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability function:
p, =  I
1 + e-(a + aXi)
where,
Pi is the probability that a decision-maker will make a certain
choice, given prior knowledge of X i
X i is the value of the independent variable for the ith variable;
e is the base of natural logarithm (approximately 2.718);
a is the constant;
fl is the coefficient of the independent variable Xj2 ".
Within the terminology of this research study, P, will be the
probability that economic interest is not present given the knowl-
edge of only the significant independent variables included in
the model. The probability that economic interest is present can
be calculated as: 1 - Pi.
A. Testing for Goodness-of-Fit
After the logit model has been identified, an assessment must
be made as to how well the model fits the data. For this
R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC FoiRE-
CASTS 247 (1976).
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evaluation a likelihood-ratio statistic is used, with the equation
being:
L 2 = 2 * 0 * ln(O/E)
where,
L 2 is the likelihood-ratio statistic;
0 is the observed cell frequencies;
E is the expected cell frequencies.
L2 compares the estimated expected cell frequencies to the
observed, and follows the chi-square distribution with the de-
grees of freedom equal to the number of parameters set to have
no effect on the dependent variable. 245 The larger the L2 is in
relation to the degrees of freedom, the more the expected cell
frequencies differ from the actual cell frequencies. Conversely,
the smaller the L2 relative to the degrees of freedom, the better
the expected cell frequencies fit the observed frequencies.
The interpretation of L 2 is opposite of that for the traditional
chi-square tests of independence. The null hypothesis is usually
sought to be rejected when using the chi-square test. With L 2,
however, the model which has been established is desired to be
accepted; thus, the reason a small L2 relative to degrees of
freedom is preferred.
One limitation of logit analysis is that it does not produce
an R2 value which is used in multiple regression to measure the
extent to which an independent variable accounts for the varia-
tion in the dependent variable. To overcome this limitation an
R2 analog has been used as an alternate, but similar, measure.
An L2 for the "baseline" model is established as a standard for
which improvements will be measured. The baseline L2 is com-
puted for the initial step of the forward stepwise procedure when
none of the independent variables are considered to affect the
dependent variable. The amount of variance in the cell frequen-
cies not explained by any of the independent variables is indicated
by the baseline L2. Subsequently, an L2 is computed for the model
which includes all of the significant independent variables (alter-
native model). Using the two L2 values the R 2 analog is:
' KNOKE & BupucE, supra note 216, at 30.
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baseline L 2 - alternate L 2
baseline L
2
Thus, the proportion of the baseline L2 that is accounted for by
the alternative L2 is found. If a high proportion of the baseline





In this study, the stepwise Logistic Regression (LR) program
of the BMDP statistical software package was utilized.2 4 7 The
output consists of the L2 at each step of the selection process to
evaluate goodness-of-fit and compute the R 2 analog. Also, for
each combination of the independent variables, the predicted
probabilities are provided so that the classification accuracy of
the observations can be easily computed.
Another very helpful statistic is furnished in the output at
each step. An improvement chi-square with degrees of freedom
is used to test the hypothesis that the term entered at that step
significantly improves prediction. 248 The formula for this chi-
square is:
Improvement X 2 = 2 * (ln(MLR))
where,
ln(MLR) is the natural logarithm of the maximum likelihood
ratio which is found by subtracting the current log likelihood
from the log likelihood for the previous step.
24 9
The improvement chi-square follows the interpretation of the
traditional chi-square tests and, therefore, a small p-value indi-
cates a significant improvement over the previous step. There-
l' Id. at 40.
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fore, for this study a maximum p-value of .10 is used so that
only the significant variables are included.
